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Introduction 
 
In April 2003, the belligerents of the Second Congo War (1998–2003) adopted a 
peace accord, signed in December 2002, that was bombastically dubbed the “Global 
and All-Inclusive Agreement”. This inaugurated a transitional period that would last 
up to the organization of general elections in 2006. The accord paved the way for a 
double political and military power-sharing deal, implying that the breed of violent 
actors that had gained dominance during the war were officially entitled to a part of 
the “national cake”. Positions in the politico-administrative apparatus were divided 
among the signatories of the peace deal, including the political representatives of 
former insurgent outfits, which were transformed into political parties. This form of 
power-sharing was mirrored in the military domain. New national armed forces were 
cobbled together from troops and officers of most of the ex-belligerent factions, 
leading to the creation of mixed units placed under an integrated command chain. 
 
The political order that developed out of this power-sharing exercise is characterized 
by intense and sometimes violent power competition, in particular in the eastern part 
of the country, where violence at various levels of intensity is ongoing. In the 
immediate post-settlement period, politico-military entrepreneurs struggled to 
maintain and extend the political, economic and military spheres of influence they had 
carved out during the wars, both within and outside the state apparatus. At the same 
time, the various competing factions tried to take advantage of the new political 
constellation by repositioning themselves in the national and sometimes also regional 
political and military arenas. A common method of such repositioning was 
participation in electoral politics, notably the 2006 and 2011 presidential and 
parliamentary elections. However, the electoral and wider political inclusion of 
former warlords is generally believed to have contributed to the ongoing violence in 
the east, in part by creating incentives among those with poor electoral prospects and 
results to take up arms. Furthermore, by reinforcing ethnic outbidding, it is said to 
have provided an impetus to armed mobilization along ethnic lines (Stearns et al. 
2013). 
 
Without contradicting these observations, this chapter intends to refine the analysis of 
how the electoral and wider political inclusion of ex-belligerents has contributed to 
the militarization of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (henceforth the 
Congo). By exploring the post-settlement trajectory of one particular politico-military 
entrepreneur, Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi, it shows how even political actors with 
relatively good electoral prospects and results, and who do not explicitly draw upon 
antagonistic ethnic discourses, have contributed to ongoing violence. During the 
Second Congo War, Mbusa was the president of the insurgent movement Congolese 
Rally for Democracy/Kisangani-Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie/Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération, RCD/K-ML), the main 
stronghold of which was the Grand Nord area, encompassing Beni and Lubero 
territories in the north of North Kivu province. After the signing of the final peace 
accord, the RCD/K-ML was transformed into a political party, of which Mbusa 
became the president. Mbusa was subsequently appointed minister in the transitional 
and first post-transitional governments, and stood for president in both the 2006 and 
2011 elections. In 2011, he also ran for election as a member of parliament (MP). 
However, whereas in 2006 the RCD/K-ML participated as part of a platform of pro-
government parties, in 2011 it ran on an opposition ticket, reflecting the growing rift 
between Mbusa and Congo’s President Joseph Kabila. 
 
This switch to the opposition can be attributed both to the changing position of Mbusa 
Nyamwisi in the national and provincial political landscape and the strategies he 
devised for navigating these arenas. Mbusa reigned supreme over the RCD/K-ML and 
therefore had preponderant influence in determining the party’s course. In continuity 
with the war era, his strategies largely followed the logics of “brokerage” and “multi-
positioning”: he maintained contacts with nominally opposed factions, whether in the 
political or military domain, which enabled him to reinforce his negotiation position 
by threatening to intensify links to other factions’ enemies. Furthermore, Mbusa 
positioned himself at once locally (in the Grand Nord, and subareas thereof), 
provincially (North Kivu), nationally (Congo) and regionally (Great Lakes area). This 
multi-positioning allowed him to play a role as gatekeeper to and broker between 
different types of networks located at different levels. 
 
Since Mbusa’s strategy of multi-positioning and brokerage included maintaining ties 
with armed groups and military figures, his post-settlement quest for power had 
important security effects. But rather than manipulating armed groups directly, he 
mostly maintained low-key, secretive contacts, creating a veil of mystery surrounding 
his dealings. Yet in a climate awash with rumors, tensions and violence, mere 
suspicion of links to armed actors has direct security effects, for instance prompting 
opposing factions to militarily reinforce their position. Furthermore, in the militarized 
political-economic order of the eastern Congo, the ability to manipulate armed actors 
is a valued currency, as it often translates into enhanced negotiating power. By 
demonstrating the value of this currency, although with diminishing effectiveness, 
Mbusa’s ways of navigating the post-settlement order have importantly contributed to 
its ongoing militarization, and therefore to the manifestations of organized violence 
that this militarization entails. As such, Mbusa’s political dealings are reminiscent of 
the classic strategy of the pompier-pyromane (firefighter-pyromaniac), referring to the 
firefighter who lights fires in order to capitalize upon his or her own capacity to 
extinguish them. 
 
While Mbusa’s personal agency has been an important factor in determining his post-
settlement trajectory, the latter has also been strongly shaped by the general political-
military context. Therefore, the chapter sets out by sketching a number of general 
characteristics of the Congo’s pre-war and post-settlement orders, and the two wars in 
between these periods. It then zooms in on Mbusa Nyamwisi, describing his personal 
career and the strategies he adopted both during the war and after the settlement, 
which are analyzed against the background of his position both in the RCD/K-ML and 
in the Grand Nord. The insights flowing from this analysis allow for drawing a 
number of conclusions on the effects of the political participation of politico-military 
entrepreneurs on the nature of the post-settlement political order, in particular its 
violent character. 
 
Two wars and two intransitive transitions 
 
The violent nature of political competition in the post-2003 era is not a novel 
phenomenon in the Congo. At regular conjunctures in the country’s history, various 
forms of violence have played a pronounced role in channeling power struggles. One 
such period followed Mobutu’s announcement of a transition to multiparty democracy 
in 1990. The subsequent limited and imperfect opening of political space intensified 
ethnic and armed mobilization. At the root of this hardening of the political climate 
was a complex interplay between, on the one hand, local-level inter-community 
tensions, often surrounding land and local authority, and on the other hand, 
manipulation by national and provincial politicians. This manipulation was partly fed 
by the divide-and-rule politics that Mobutu embarked upon to thwart the nascent 
democratization process (Mamdani 1998). One manifestation of this was géopolitique 
or an effort to balance political and administrative representation between different 
regional and ethnic groups. Géopolitique institutionalized competition between 
groups framed as “ethnic”, and focused attention to the question of who was a 
“native” and could therefore represent a certain area, and who was not (Mararo 2005). 
A second strategy was the application of the pompier-pyromane scenario. This 
entailed stoking up animosities to the point that they turned violent, and 
then extinguishing them in order to reassert control, in this way reinforcing and 
demonstrating authority. The clearest application of this strategy was in the province 
of Shaba (now Katanga), where political manipulation fueled an ethnic cleansing 
campaign executed by radical youth militias that led to the expulsion of thousands of 
Kasaians, many of whom died, in 1992 and 1993 (Dibwe dia Mwembu 1999). While 
top-down manipulation was less evident in the case of the violence that flared up in 
North Kivu in 1993, which was strongly nourished by long-standing local tensions, 
the national political context did provide new incentives for armed mobilization, and 
the provincial politicians that played a key role as instigators were close allies of 
Mobutu (Mararo 2003). 
 
Due to concerted efforts to derail the democratization process, not least by Mobutu, 
the announced introduction of a multiparty system heralded no more than an 
“intransitive transition” (de Villers and Omasombo 2002), which ultimately fostered 
exclusionary and violent politics. Yet despite managing to maintain the upper hand in 
this disorder, Mobutu was not to retain power for long. In 1997 he was ousted from 
power by an insurgent coalition backed by regional powers, the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (Alliance des Forces 
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre, AFDL). Within less than seven 
months, the insurgents managed to capture Kinshasa, thereby ending the First Congo 
War (1996–1997). However, the new regime that was installed under Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila soon fell out with its erstwhile backers, in particular Rwanda and Uganda. The 
latter therefore engineered yet another rebellion, that of the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, RCD), which erupted in 
August 1998. This inaugurated the Second Congo War (1998–2003), which grew to 
be a complex mixture of a regional war that drew in no fewer than seven African 
countries, a variety of civil wars that were fought on Congolese soil, and a myriad of 
local conflicts that turned violent. The Congo became a patchwork of political-
military orders, having a government-held zone in the west, and a host of rebel-held 
areas in other parts, most of which were further fragmented due to the presence of 
dozens of small-scale armed groups, often labeled “Mai-Mai”. The most important 
Congolese rebel movements were the Uganda-backed Movement for the Liberation of 
the Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, MLC) in the northwest, and the 
RCD in the east. However, the RCD gradually fell apart into three factions due to 
power struggles and differences in political vision and strategic preferences, both 
between and among its foreign supporters and their Congolese clients. While the core 
group of the RCD, supported by Rwanda, controlled the province of South Kivu, and 
parts of the provinces of Maniema, Katanga and North Kivu, specifically its southern 
part, a Uganda-backed branch, which gradually morphed into the RCD/K-ML, had its 
fiefdom in the Grand Nord. A smaller faction called RCD-National, which was also 
sponsored by Uganda, operated to the north of that, in Orientale Province (Lanotte 
2003; Stearns 2011). 
 
The multitude of belligerents involved in the Second Congo War severely hampered 
the implementation of the final peace accord and related power-sharing arrangements. 
The signatories were a motley crew comprised of the following parties: the Congolese 
government, since 2001 headed by President Joseph Kabila in the wake of his father’s 
assassination; the “unarmed political opposition” regrouping twenty-eight different 
political parties; the somewhat nebulous category of “civil society”; and finally five 
armed players, one of which, the so-called “Mai-Mai entity”, consisted of a loose 
amalgam of myriad armed groups. All these factions vied for position not only 
between, but also among themselves, which both exacerbated existing internal 
divisions and generated new ones. This power competition compounded policy 
processes, not least because it polarized decision-making bodies. The transitional 
presidency, comprised of one president and no fewer than four vice-presidents from 
different factions, was no exception to this. This so-called “1 + 4” formula was 
emblematic of the entrenched factionalism, power grabbing and political paralysis 
that were a hallmark of this second transition, as epitomized by the widely circulating 
pun “1 + 4 = 0” (Willame 2007). 
 
Aside from the power struggles, the transition was also hampered by the slow pace 
and problematic nature of the military integration process. In order to maintain their 
military spheres of influence, several belligerents withheld (a part of) their troops 
from integration. This was for instance the case with Mai-Mai groups that had only 
local spheres of influence and constituencies, and lacked connections and clout at the 
national level. Similar foot-dragging could be detected among larger groups that were 
marginalized in the presidential patronage network and stood little chance in the 
elections, but had relatively autonomous sources of revenue, for example controlling 
trans-border trade networks or having direct outside support. To such groups, which 
included a part of the RCD, the main strategy of navigating the transition was to 
maintain a powerbase predominantly outside of the centrally controlled state 
apparatus. Consequently, they withheld a part of their troops from the military 
integration process. Other groups, by contrast, invested heavily in the political games 
played out in the new national political arena, and were more willing to send their 
troops into the national army. This did not imply, however, that they readily ceded 
control over their local strongholds or entirely gave up independent military 
capacities. Rather, they mostly changed the modalities of maintaining control, trying 
to manipulate the national and local state institutions, including the national armed 
forces. They maintained networks of loyal officers within the army, leading to parallel 
command chains and divided loyalties. For example, the MLC initially held on to a 
large separate security guard to protect its president. Some factions also resorted to 
non-state channels to retain a capacity for militarized maneuvering, such as liaising 
with foreign rebel groups or local militias (Verweijen 2014). As will be further 
explained below, this was also the strategy followed by parts of the RCD/K-ML. 
 
The ex-belligerents’ half-hearted commitment to military integration importantly 
contributed to the ongoing militarization of politics, prompting competing factions to 
turn to (threats of) force or army disintegration to reinforce their political position. As 
this strategy was often successful, a system emerged in which political actors had 
incentives to take up arms (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2013). The continued 
existence of (semi-)autonomous military forces both within and outside of the 
national military also perpetuated the militarization of the economy in the east, as 
these armed actors underpinned ‒ either directly or indirectly ‒ the coercion-based 
control of production and trade networks. Electoral politics added significant 
volatility to this toxic mix. The post-settlement Congo became a competitive-
authoritarian order (Matti 2010), where those linked to the presidential patronage 
network have preferential access to coveted positions in the state apparatus. This 
confines the opposition to positions of lesser influence, mainly in the toothless 
parliament. The result is a zero-sum game political environment, where access to the 
government and presidential patronage network is the highest price. In the militarized 
context of the eastern Congo, such a political environment incentivizes those faced 
with bleak electoral prospects or results to manipulate armed actors. This could most 
clearly be observed among the RCD, whose poor electoral prospects contributed to 
the group’s disintegration, prompting a dissident faction to launch a new rebellion, the 
National Congress for the Defense of the People (Congrès National pour la Défense 
du Peuple, CNDP) (Stearns 2013a). 
 
The potential for electoral processes to have destabilizing effects is further reinforced 
by the strong ethnic and regional identity-based character of political mobilization in 
the Congo (Ngoy-Kangoy 2007). On occasion, this translates into ethnic outbidding, 
which may include the manipulation of non-state armed groups formed along ethnic 
lines. Electoral politics also contributes to volatility by fostering the severe 
fragmentation of the political landscape, which intensifies power competition. Based 
on proportional representation with open-list, multi-member constituencies,1  the 
electoral system promotes a focus on candidates rather than programs. This focus is 
further reinforced by the personalization of politics and the absence of a tradition of 
party politics with parties grounded in well-articulated political visions (Ngoy-
Kangoy 2006). No fewer than 9,709 candidates stood for the 2006 elections, a large 
part of whom ran as independents. Furthermore, from the around 269 parties 
registered at that time, sixty-seven entered the 500-seat legislature (Carter Center 
2007). The first legislative elections organized after the transition, in 2011, were 
characterized by an even more pronounced fragmentation: while 18,386 candidates 
participated, ninety-eight of the registered 417 political parties entered the national 
assembly, of which seventy-six had five seats or less (Carter Center 2011). A similar 
fragmentation is visible in the military sphere, at least in the eastern Congo, home to 
several dozens of domestic and foreign armed groups of all stripes. This multifaceted 
fragmentation has created a climate in which forging and changing political and 
military alliances have become important power strategies. 
 
It can be concluded that the 2003–2006 period has largely turned out to be yet another 
“intransitive transition”, not having induced a significant transformation of the 
patronage- and violence-based political order of the pre-settlement era (Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers 2008). Although operating in a different context and with a 
different style than Mobutu, President Joseph Kabila similarly relies on a combination 
of coercion and doling out patronage-related benefits via personal networks, even 
while his control over the coercive apparatus is tenuous. Yet, as the post-settlement 
trajectory of Mbusa Nyamwisi clearly demonstrates, the presidential patronage 
network has sufficient weight to heavily shape political actors’ position in the 
political landscape, and those who are marginalized by this network suffer serious 
losses of influence. Militarized maneuvering can only partly undo such 
marginalization. 
 
The trajectory of Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi: champion of double-dealing 
 
As an amalgamation of elites with different political visions and interests, the RCD 
rebellion was never a coherent movement. In March 1999, then leader Ernest Wamba 
dia Wamba, a former university professor who was strongly backed by Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni, was ousted from the movement. He established himself 
in the city of Kisangani, where he engineered his own branch of the RCD with the 
help of Uganda, eventually called the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-
Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération, RCD-K/ML). Soon after, a definite falling out 
between Uganda and Rwanda, leading to heavy clashes in the city of Kisangani, 
forced the movement to set up its headquarters in the town of Bunia (in Orientale 
Province) to the east. It was here that a vicious and at times violent leadership 
struggle started that would end in Mbusa Nyamwisi taking over the presidency of the 
movement in November 2000, in what has generally been described as a coup d’état 
that triggered fierce fighting (International Crisis Group 2000). Mbusa is a politician 
of Nande origins, representing the single largest ethnic group in the province of North 
Kivu. The Nande are concentrated in the Grand Nord, but also have a substantial 
presence in Orientale. Reflecting the ethno-regional character of his primary support 
base, Mbusa decided to establish the headquarters of the movement in Beni, an 
important trade center in the Grand Nord close to the Ugandan border. 
 
The bumpy road to prominence Mbusa had started his political career in the shadow 
of his brother Enoch Muvingi, who had been a ministerial adviser and minister in 
various governments under Mobutu. Enoch was also one of the founders of the 
political party Federalist Christian Democracy (Démocratie Chrétienne Fédéraliste, 
DCF), which was formed after the opening of political space in 1990. He led the 
DCF/Nyamwisi, which had a mostly Nande constituency, but was a member of the 
wider Christian Democrat political family. Muvingi reached the apex of his power 
during the transition, when géopolitique led to the marginalization of the 
Banyarwanda in the provincial and national political institutions. The term 
“Banyarwanda” refers to Hutu and Tutsi, and both groups are “Rwandophones” or 
speakers of Kinyarwanda language.2 The Banyarwanda, an amalgam of heterogeneous 
groups, are the second largest category in North Kivu, and have been involved in a 
long-standing struggle with the Nande for political and economic preponderance at 
the provincial level (Mararo 2003). Muvingi tried to capitalize upon this struggle, 
hoping to draw popular support by propagating antagonism against the Banyarwanda. 
He also supported a variety of militias to reinforce his power, thereby constituting an 
early example of a politico-military entrepreneur. These included the Kasindiens, 
located in the home base of the Nyamwisi family, the Rwenzori region, and the 
Bangilima, who operated as a type of youth militia of the DCF/Nyamwisi (Mararo 
2003). Discovering the political and economic leverage obtained through contacts 
with armed actors, Muvingi volunteered to become a broker between Mobutu and the 
Ugandan rebels of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) based in 
the Ruwenzori mountains. Mobutu intended to employ this group to weaken Ugandan 
President Museveni, a political leader he profoundly disliked (Raeymaekers 2009). 
This shows that the militarization of politics in the eastern Congo had already started 
before the outbreak of the wars. 
 
When Enoch Muvingi was assassinated in 1993, Mbusa became his political heir, 
assuming the position of secretary general of the DCF/Nyamwisi. Although he lacked 
the charisma and rhetorical skills of his brother, he took direct inspiration from the 
militarized strategies of power politics and multi-positioning the latter had pioneered. 
However, Mbusa did not immediately embark upon a political career, being initially 
more active in the long-distance trade with East and Southeast Asia. His political star 
first started to rise after he allied himself with the AFDL, the regional-domestic 
insurgent coalition that toppled Mobutu in 1997, of whose plans he was informed 
during a meeting with Museveni in Uganda in 1996. When learning of Uganda’s 
intention to get involved in the second insurgency that started in 1998, he again seized 
the opportunity and became one of the RCD’s founding members (Omasomba et al. 
2009). While his exact motives for this move are unknown, it seems that personal 
ambitions and the opportunities that unfolded due to his regional contacts played an 
important role. 
 
The splits and power struggles within the RCD and its offshoots subsequently offered 
Mbusa yet more possibilities for advancing his career. The strong dominance of 
Banyarwanda in the Rwanda-backed RCD wing established in Goma allowed him to 
play upon fears among the Nande population about the growing power of this group. 
Mbusa was also well positioned within the powerful Nande business community, 
which has traditionally thrived on forms of cross-border trade under favorable tax 
regimes resulting from the manipulation of rules and regulations. Additionally, he 
could draw on the networks and reputation of his deceased brother, the politician 
Enoch Muvingi. What further consolidated his power was that he managed to build up 
close ties with key figures in the militarized trans-boundary economic networks that 
developed in the course of the war, often building on pre-existing economic 
configurations. Thus, he maintained friendly relations with certain Ugandan 
businesspeople and officers of the Ugandan armed forces, like General James Kazini 
and Museveni’s half-brother Salim Saleh (International Crisis Group 2003). In 
combination with aggressive political maneuvering, this powerbase allowed him to 
eventually take over the leadership of the RCD/K-ML. Although Ugandan President 
Yoweri Museveni disliked Mbusa and the form of ethnicized politics that he 
represented, clearly favoring the more ideologically oriented Wamba dia Wamba, he 
eventually accepted the power takeover largely for pragmatic reasons (International 
Crisis Group 2000). 
 
Multi-positioning and brokerage In comparison to the much bigger RCD to the 
south, the RCD/K-ML was a second-tier politico-military movement. It exercised 
weak and contested control over the Nande-dominated territories of Beni and Lubero, 
not least due to strong divisions among the Nande and between the Nande and 
minority groups, while also having a zone of varying influence in Orientale Province. 
Its military wing, the Congolese Popular Army (Armée Populaire Congolaise, APC), 
numbered around 3,000–5,000 troops, and functioned as a conventional army with a 
core of partly Uganda-educated officers (International Crisis Group 2006). It was 
placed under the control of the political executive, which was presided over by Mbusa 
Nyamwisi and two vice-presidents, who directed a number of commissaires or 
ministers with various portfolios. However, these ministers had little influence, as 
Nyamwisi and a small clique around him had preponderant power over the 
movement. Similarly, the congress of the RCD/K-ML, formally erected to represent 
the base, had a mostly symbolic character (Raeymaekers 2007). 
 
Rather than creating entirely new administrative structures, the RCD/K-ML 
administered the Grand Nord by means of influencing existing agencies via a 
combination of patronage politics, coercion and evasion, or the bypassing of the 
administration by seeking new channels, notably in the business sector. While this 
allowed the movement to have a reasonable degree of influence, it diminished its 
chances of gaining widespread support and legitimacy, focused as it was on co-opting 
business and administrative elites. Overall, the movement had limited popularity 
outside the circle of those directly benefiting from its economic governance. It was, 
for example, strongly contested by players like the influential Catholic Church and the 
Mai-Mai militias that mushroomed in the countryside (Raeymaekers 2007). This 
situation strongly shaped Mbusa’s strategies and paths of action, both during the war 
and in the post-settlement era. 
 
In order to ensure the support and tap into the resources of the Nande business 
community, a crucial constituency that was however not particularly keen on getting 
involved in insurgent politics, the RCD/K-ML administration seized upon the existing 
system of pre-financing that had been pioneered by customs agencies. Under this 
system, economic operators were granted tax exemptions in return for fixed pre-
payments on customs duties in cash. Engaging in such arrangements was mutually 
beneficial, as it gave the RCD/KML income and allowed traders to continue their 
business activities in a beneficial tax and security climate. Since the income of the 
RCD/K-ML thus came to depend directly on the flourishing of the business 
community, the movement had vested interests in guaranteeing property rights and 
the safety of important trade routes. At the same time, its dependence on economic 
operators allowed the latter to remain relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the insurgents, 
which enabled them to play a growing role in the provision of public goods like 
infrastructure (Raeymaekers 2007). The resulting business-friendly climate led to 
significant prosperity for some, generating a construction boom in the Grand Nord’s 
main towns of Beni and Butembo, for instance. This boom was further promoted by 
the RCD/K-ML’s policy of exempting building materials like cement from import 
duties, a measure that was partly intended to win popularity. A similar rationality 
motivated other tax cuts, fostering an overall beneficial fiscal climate.3 However, 
large parts of the population of the Grand Nord were excluded from the spoils, or 
even saw their income drop drastically, as rampant insecurity in the countryside 
hampered agricultural production and trade (Raeymaekers 2004). Furthermore, much 
prosperity was generated via economic networks that engaged in coercive and illegal 
strategies of accumulation, such as theft, tax fraud, manipulation of the money supply 
and the instrumentalization of local militias to control resource-rich areas. Much of 
the benefit accrued to Ugandan economic operators, most of whom were exempted 
from tax payments, leading to accusations of resources plunder (UNSC 2002). 
 
Insecurity in the countryside was partly the result of the activities of numerous Mai-
Mai groups, which mobilized around narratives of resistance against foreign 
influence. These groups were often instrumentalized by local strongmen, like 
economic operators and customary chiefs, to reinforce their position in local conflicts 
and the economy. Certain groups also received support from figures in the Catholic 
Church, which had tense relations with the Protestant Nyamwisi. While many Mai-
Mai groups, like Muhola and Vurundo, occasionally clashed with Mbusa’s forces, 
some would at times also collaborate with them, following the complex pattern of 
ever-changing alliances between a multitude of domestic and foreign armed actors 
that characterized the Second Congo War (Belaid 2015). In the RCD/K-ML’s area of 
influence, foreign forces did not only include the Ugandan military, but also the 
remnants of the NALU, which had by then fused with another Ugandan rebel group 
named Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (Titeca and Vlassenroot 2012). Despite 
numerous counterinsurgency operations by the Ugandan military, this group 
continued to retain substantial capacity for nuisance, including within Uganda. 
 
While changes of alliances were ongoing, some were more important than others. One 
of the most significant shakeups of the political-military landscape occurred at the end 
of the year 2000, when Uganda tried to reunite the three major insurgent movements 
it sponsored in the Congo (the MLC, RCD/K-ML and RCD-N), proposing Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, the leader of the MLC, as the president of the united movement. Experiencing 
this as a direct threat to his leadership, Mbusa decided to sabotage the reunification 
attempt, leading to intense fighting in the course of 2001 (International Crisis Group 
2003). Realizing he would be in a weak position if the other two movements formed a 
common front against him with the support of an increasingly hostile Kampala, he 
decided to play a new card and approached Kinshasa.4 The same repositioning 
prompted the RCD/K-ML to reinforce contacts with the ADF-NALU (International 
Crisis Group 2007), which helped to gain further leverage vis-à-vis Uganda. This 
shows how Mbusa’s war-era strategy consisted essentially of two components. First, 
“multi-positioning”, or flexibly maintaining contacts with numerous often nominally 
opposed factions, and then gaining leverage by changing or threatening to change 
alliances. Second, “brokerage”, or deriving political capital from having and 
controlling access to different networks and groups located in various arenas and at 
various scales (local, provincial, national, regional).5 These strategies were partly 
born out of weakness, with the RCD/K-ML lacking comprehensive political and 
military control, while enjoying only limited popularity (Raeymaekers 2004). 
 
Transitional dealings and electoral posturing: sort of running for president 
Mbusa’s 2001 rapprochement with Kabila was not only the product of the changing 
strategies of Kampala. It was also related to the new dynamics generated by an 
acceleration of the peace process and the looming of a negotiated settlement based on 
the principle of power-sharing. By placing his bets on an alliance with Kinshasa, 
Mbusa hoped to entrench his rather tenuous grip over his fiefdom and secure his place 
in the transitional order. This strategy was largely successful: Mbusa became well 
positioned in the presidential patronage network, allowing the RCD/K-ML to obtain a 
significant number of posts in the transitional institutions. The party was granted two 
ministerial and two vice-ministerial posts, important appointments in the public 
enterprises, fifteen out of 500 seats in the general assembly, and considerable weight 
in the provincial administration of North Kivu. Mbusa Nyamwisi became minister of 
regional cooperation, allowing him to build on and extend his network of regional 
contacts.6 He also capitalized on his privileged access to the presidential circle, which 
enabled him to play a role as broker between his local networks in the Grand Nord 
and politicians at the national level. In continuity with the personalized and 
patronage-based politics that had been a hallmark of the RCD/K-ML in its insurgent 
years, it was mostly Mbusa who decided on appointments in the national institutions, 
a discretionary power that significantly reinforced his position among his local 
constituency.7 At the same time, this intermediary role meant that Kinshasa had to go 
through him to exercise influence over the Grand Nord, rendering him an 
indispensable ally in the reunification process. 
 
Kinshasa’s dependency on Mbusa’s brokerage granted the RCD/K-ML and its wider 
networks a relatively high level of autonomy, which allowed them to maintain a 
predominant influence over the customs, border control and intelligence agencies in 
the Grand Nord, in particular at the border post of Kasindi. In this manner, Mbusa 
was able to guarantee the continuation of a favorable fiscal climate, and thereby to 
secure the support of the trans-border trade networks that were at the heart of the 
RCD/K-ML’s powerbase. However, since these networks thrived on protection 
agreements and locally negotiated tax reductions, they deprived the political center of 
important sources of revenue. Kinshasa’s position was however too fragile to seek an 
immediate showdown, not least since the RCD/K-ML’s position of relative autonomy 
was backed up by continuing coercive control. Throughout the transition, the Grand 
Nord was controlled by the 88th and 89th brigades, which were predominantly 
composed of APC troops, although these were now formally part of the new national 
armed forces, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces 
Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) (Meece 2006a). It was 
only after the 2006 elections that a part of these troops departed in order to participate 
in the military integration process, leading to their replacement by FARDC Integrated 
Brigades, composed of soldiers of various ex-belligerent factions (Dougherty 2006). 
However, many ex-APC troops remained quasi-demobilized in the Grand 
Nord, guarding their uniforms and arms,8 while others were sent into the forest to 
form a new group (UNSC 2016). This “reserve force” was in contact with ex-APC 
officers who had integrated into the FARDC, but continued to further factional 
interests. 
 
The transition allowed Mbusa to consolidate his position not only vis-à-vis Kinshasa, 
but also within the Grand Nord, capitalizing upon his control over the RCD/K-ML’s 
access to the national political-administrative arena. He had even started to gain 
somewhat in popularity, being applauded as a “pioneer of national reunification”. He 
was also credited with having reinforced the Nande’s political representation and 
influence at the national level, as exemplified by the elevation of Beni and Butembo 
to the status of city during the transition, a long-standing demand of the Nande.9  
Emboldened by his strengthened position, Mbusa decided to stand for president 
during the 2006 elections, despite his limited popularity outside the Grand Nord. This 
decision is likely to have been influenced by his expectation to run on the ticket of a 
broad electoral alliance under the name of Forces du Renouveau  (Forces for 
Renewal). This strategy, however, largely fell through, as certain key factions 
declined to join the alliance. Crucially, Mbusa’s main partner, Olivier Kamitatu of the 
Alliance for the Renewal of the Congo (Alliance pour le Renouveau du Congo, ARC), 
rallied to the electoral platform linked to the incumbent, the Alliance for the 
Presidential Majority (Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle, AMP). Realizing he 
had few other options, Mbusa decided just before the elections not to compete with 
the incumbent, encouraging his constituency to vote for Kabila, while campaigning 
with the Forces du Renouveau as part of the AMP (Meece 2006b). 
 
Post-transitional waxing and waning While implemented last-minute, this altered 
electoral strategy paid off: the Forces du Renouveau, which also regrouped the 
DCF/Nyamwisi, closely allied to the RCD/K-ML, obtained three ministerial and three 
vice-ministerial positions in the new government, and twenty-eight out of 500 seats in 
the national assembly. Mbusa was rewarded for his move to the Kabila camp with a 
ministerial post of vital importance, that of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation.10 Provincially, too, the RCD/K-ML managed to hold on to its influence. 
This became particularly clear in the battle for the position of governor of North Kivu, 
who is elected by the provincial assembly. Aside from giving access to power, the 
position of governor has a high symbolic value, reflecting who has predominant 
influence at the provincial level. It had therefore been a thorn in the Nande’s flesh that 
during the transition the position had been occupied by a Hutu issuing from the 
Rwanda-backed wing of the RCD. These high political and symbolic stakes prompted 
the RCD/K-ML to engage in concerted efforts to push through its own candidate, 
despite the fact that the AMP supported another Nande politician, Jean-Chrysostome 
Vahamwiti Mukesyayira. Wary to let this crucial position slip out of its hands, the 
RCD/K-ML mobilized its contacts in the Nande business community to gather the 
funds and harness the pressure needed for a favorable outcome of the gubernatorial 
elections.11 On 27 January 2007, Julien Paluku Kahongya, member of RCD/K-ML 
and protégé of Mbusa Nyamwisi, was elected with twenty-five out of forty-two 
votes.12 These results indicate that although linked to the ruling platform of the AMP, 
the RCD/K-ML had managed to maintain an autonomous powerbase at the level of 
North Kivu. 
 
This base would soon start to erode. At the end of 2008, after a government reshuffle 
following the demission of Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga, Mbusa lost his 
prestigious job as minister of foreign affairs, being appointed to the much less 
influential post of Minister of Decentralization and Spatial Planning. The reasons for 
this demotion are difficult to fathom, but could well be linked to the general tendency 
in patronage-based systems to ensure regular rotations of office with an eye to 
avoiding clients building up too much autonomy (see Bayart [1989] 2006). In this 
case, it is possible that Kinshasa hoped that weakening Mbusa, already seen as 
dissident by pushing through his own candidate for governor, would allow them to 
reinforce their grip over the political-economic networks in the Grand Nord that 
continued to deprive it of important revenues. Mbusa, however, was unwilling to 
allow the political center to encroach upon his sphere of influence, adopting an 
increasingly antagonistic stance vis-à-vis the Kabila government, which he accused of 
corruption and opportunism. Having less to distribute to his networks in terms of 
influence and access to positions at the national level, he gradually started to lose 
standing both within his party and among his wider constituency in the Grand Nord 
(Brock 2009). Increasingly distributing the scarce available resources among his inner 
circle only, criticism of his leadership grew, as it highlighted his penchant for 
clientelism and autocratic tendencies.13 These developments caused certain groups in 
the party, like the boyomais  (referring to inhabitants of Orientale Province) political 
cadres and party membership, to feel increasingly marginalized. Although the 
majority of the RCD/K-ML’s national MPs had been elected in Orientale Province, it 
was predominantly Nande from the Grand Nord who were granted access to positions 
of importance at the national level. These exclusionary tendencies eventually caused 
certain politicians to leave, thus undermining the party by weakening its base 
(Jokanko no date). 
 
Mbusa’s popularity among his electorate in the Grand Nord was similarly on the 
wane, fed by growing dissatisfaction about his mediocre efforts to improve the quality 
of governance and the weak performance of the Kabila government more generally. 
Insecurity in the Grand Nord remained rampant, as multiple Mai-Mai and foreign 
armed groups, notably the ADF, continued to operate, often with the support of 
political and economic actors who appealed to these groups to reinforce their position. 
Mbusa was not immune to that logic, allegedly maintaining contacts with certain 
armed group commanders and ex-APC officers in the FARDC who were linked to the 
ex-APC “reserve force”.14 This militarized power complex, in turn, reinforced the 
mobilization of competing groups, such as the Mai-Mai led by Kakule Sikuli 
Lafontaine. However, like many other Mai-Mai groups, Lafontaine claimed to be in 
the bush to counter the influence of the CNDP, an important Tutsi-led armed group 
operating in the southern part of North Kivu (Belaid 2015). In the face of the 
operational weaknesses of the FARDC, the specter of the CNDP induced an informal 
policy of encouraging or tolerating secret alliances with other armed groups (Stearns 
2013b). This policy is likely also one of the reasons why few steps were undertaken to 
investigate allegations of continuing contacts between parts of Mbusa’s network and 
the ADF, reported to run via Mbusa’s brother Edouard Nyamwisi, the chief of 
Ruwenzori sector (Mwanawavene et al. 2006). While there were several indications 
that these links existed, Kinshasa undertook no action, in part because it believed that 
the ADF could function as a bulwark of last resort against CNDP influence (Titeca 
and Vlassenroot 2012). Whether real or imagined, these presumed contacts with 
armed groups gave Mbusa Nyamwisi political leverage both in Kinshasa and in 
Kampala, which still feared the ADF. Believing that Mbusa could ultimately muster a 
certain influence over these groups, he continued to be seen as indispensable for 
maintaining regime security, in spite of his diminishing weight in formal political 
institutions.15 
 
In sum, similar to other important political figures with a rebel background, Mbusa 
Nyamwisi’s post-settlement strategies have remained firmly marked by a militarized 
logic, leading him to maintain contacts of a varying nature with different armed 
actors. While not hesitating to feed into and instrumentalize divisions, Mbusa has, 
however, largely refrained from stoking up ethnic antagonisms by employing 
extremist rhetoric. Certainly, as an important incarnation of the Nande’s aspirations, 
he regularly appealed to their competition with and dislike for Rwandophones, not 
hesitating to characterize the latter in stereotypes and ascribe them evil intentions (see 
for example Brock 2009). However, he has employed such narratives generally more 
in internal power competition, accusing fellow Nande of being complicit with 
Rwandophones, than to directly target Rwandophones themselves.16  Hence, 
especially in comparison with more radical voices, he has been relatively moderate, 
and is not known for grounding his influence in fueling ethnic tensions. Yet this 
moderation has done little to assure him popularity, and might have even undermined 
it. 
 
Slipping toward the opposition With his influence and popularity steadily on the 
wane, and feeling increasingly hostile towards Kabila, Mbusa embarked upon a 
dangerous move. On 24 May 2010 he created a political platform called Liberal and 
Patriotic Center (Centre Libéral et Patriotique, CLP) together with three other 
ambitious and outspoken politicians who were also linked to the AMP (pro-
government alliance).17 While interpretations of the reasons behind this initiative 
vary, it is generally believed that it was born out of dissatisfaction with the 
performance of Prime Minister Muzito and the government in general, and the desire 
to influence the appointment of his successor, not least out of personal ambition. At 
the same time, it was a way of political repositioning in the face of the upcoming 
general elections, including for Mbusa, who hoped it would help counter his 
marginalization. Enraged by the initiative, which posed a clear threat to his power, 
President Kabila abruptly broke off a journey to Egypt and called an emergency 
meeting at Kingakati, his private ranch east of Kinshasa, on 26 May 2011. Not 
holding back his anger, he gave what the media called “the gang of four” an 
ultimatum to end what he saw as a secessionist attempt within the AMP, a threat that 
was sufficiently serious to prompt “the gang” to immediately withdraw (Le Potentiel 
2010; La Prosperité 2010). In the case of Mbusa, the damage done to his relations 
with Kabila appeared irreparable, leading him to quit the AMP. Not surprisingly, in 
the next cabinet reshuffle in September 2011, he was not reappointed as minister. 
Aside from destroying his relations with Kabila, the CLP adventure caused further 
dissension and divisions within the RCD/K-ML, as Mbusa had embarked upon the 
initiative without consulting the party.18 
 
A similar controversy was sparked by Mbusa’s rather unexpected and last-minute 
decision to run for president in the 2011 elections. As in 2006, this plan seems to have 
been informed by his anticipation of a great electoral coalition, this time of all 
opposition candidates. However, as with previous strategic moves, he failed to consult 
the party, some factions of which doubted the wisdom of his candidacy given the lack 
of time and resources for campaigning.19 Hence, this electoral adventure further 
illustrates how the RCD/K-ML served to a large extent as a vehicle for Mbusa’s 
interests, with his powerbase being ultimately grounded more in economic networks 
in the Grand Nord than in the party. As in 2006, Mbusa’s expectations concerning the 
possibilities to forge an electoral coalition proved too optimistic, and the opposition 
eventually failed to unite. In combination with his own lack of preparation, this made 
him decide to advise his electorate to vote for the opposition figure Étienne 
Tshisekedi, although he did stand as a presidential candidate himself. In the Grand 
Nord his advice was overwhelming followed, although a fair share of the electorate 
still voted for Mbusa himself,20 allegedly as a result of a last-ditch effort by the 
Butembo business community to mobilize voters.21 This support also helped him 
draw a large number of votes in the legislative elections, allowing him to become MP 
for the constituency of the city of Butembo. In general, the RCD/K-ML did relatively 
well in the 2011 legislative elections, obtaining six seats in the national assembly, 
while sister party DCF/Nyamwisi managed to get three (CENI 2012). At the root of 
this relative success was a general disappointment with the Kabila government in the 
Grand Nord, causing the electorate to overwhelmingly support the RCD/K-ML’s 
move to the opposition. 
 
However, in light of the zero-sum nature of politics in the Congo, where the 
government camp virtually monopolizes power, the move to the opposition created 
hardship for the party and Mbusa’s personal networks. Barred from access to 
positions of importance, they experienced a steep decline in influence and income, 
making it increasingly attractive to switch sides. The possibilities to do so were 
greatly enhanced when governor Julien Paluku, who had been elected to the national 
assembly in 2011 on an RCD/K-ML ticket, announced the creation of his own party 
shortly after the elections, the United Bloc for the Renaissance and Emergence of the 
Congo (Bloc Uni pour la Renaissance et l’Emergence du Congo, BUREC). Due to his 
function of governor, and his favorable position in the presidential patronage network, 
it was henceforth Paluku who controlled the Nande’s access to the state apparatus, 
albeit more at the provincial than the national level. This was a desirable scenario for 
Kabila, allowing him to gradually weaken the RCD/K-ML, and therefore the quasi-
autonomous economic networks depriving Kinshasa of income. Compared to Mbusa, 
Paluku has less influential connections in the Nande business community and at the 
regional (Great Lakes) level, and fewer capabilities for mobilizing (threats of) force, 
since he lacks connections to ex-APC officers or armed groups. Consequently, he 
depends to a large extent on Kabila’s patronage for the exercise of power, rendering 
him a loyal client. 
 
With political mobilization in the Congo continuing to follow regional-ethnic lines, it 
was clear that Paluku depended on the same constituency as the RCD/K-ML. In an 
effort to rally its cadres to his own party, he employed a strategy of carrots and sticks, 
including threats to purge the administrative apparatus of those who would not change 
political color. This led to what is generally called the burecation of the provincial 
and local institutions.22 That this strategy was successful is powerfully evidenced by 
the decision of the mayors of Beni and Butembo to change political camps, since both 
these cities used to be important strongholds of Mbusa. Burecation also touched upon 
the posts that guarantee the semi-autonomous functioning of Nande economic 
networks, such as the customs and import/export control agencies based in Kasindi or 
the provincial financial service of the Directorate-General for Revenue-North Kivu 
(Direction Générale des Recettes-Nord Kivu, DGR-NK). Hence the presidential 
patronage network has tried to seize upon the RCD/K-ML’s waning influence to 
weaken the network’s hold over the Kasindi border post, appointing loyalists either 
directly or via Paluku, who has a growing influence over appointments.23 In this 
manner, the already heavily divided Nande community has become subject to further 
political rifts. 
 
Misguided militarized posturing: flirting with the M23? Mbusa’s efforts to deal 
with the waning influence of the RCD/K-ML have only reinforced political divisions 
among the Nande. In 2012, parts of the CNDP, which had integrated into the FARDC 
in 2009, mutinied and started a new rebellion, the Movement of 23 March 
(Mouvement du 23 Mars, M23). This movement was sponsored by Rwanda, but there 
were also indications of limited and more passive involvement by Uganda, believed to 
largely run via presidential military adviser General Salim Saleh (UNSC 2012). This 
involvement appears to have been more driven by Kampala’s wish to have leverage 
over an insurgency which was close to its borders and implicated its powerful 
neighbor Rwanda than to actively promote it. Furthermore, getting involved would 
render Kinshasa partly dependent on Uganda for efforts to manage the insurgency, 
thus allowing Kampala to enhance its regional sphere of influence. One way to 
achieve the desired leverage, so it seems, was to motivate old allies of Uganda within 
the RCD/K-ML to join or liaise with the M23. Given his role as gatekeeper to this 
network, Mbusa Nyamwisi was an indispensable figure in these efforts. He willingly 
seized upon this opportunity to reposition himself at the national and regional level, 
fabricating the impression that he was an essential figure for the rebellion’s 
expansion, which gave him renewed importance in both Kampala and Kinshasa. 
Following his familiar strategy of double-dealings, he did not become openly allied to 
the M23 or actively involved in it, instead adopting a wait and see attitude and 
retaining a veil of mystery about his possible involvement. Thus he maintained a 
guarded silence from abroad, reportedly moving between South Africa and Tanzania 
after having gone into exile after leaving his post in parliament in 2012. His direct 
involvement in the M23 has therefore been difficult to prove, allowing his supporters 
to deny it and to ascribe the accusations to a smear campaign intended to crack down 
on the opposition (Nkole no date). 
 
Yet several family members and former APC officers believed to be close to Mbusa 
did join the M23.24 In December 2012, Mbusa’s brother Edouard Nyamwisi was 
arrested in Butembo on allegations of maintaining contacts with M23-linked 
networks. Furthermore, there are indications that Mbusa was involved in engineering 
a new coalition of Nande armed groups under the leadership of Hilaire Kombi, an ex-
APC officer who deserted from the FARDC in mid-2012. This group was reported to 
be in regular contact with M23, including via a liaison officer who also used to be in 
the APC (UNSC 2013). The mobilization of these military figures was relatively easy, 
given that many former ex-APC officers felt marginalized within the FARDC. These 
feelings were reinforced after the integration of the CNDP in 2009, which revived old 
resentments about Rwandophone domination of the command chain within the 
FARDC (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2013). Furthermore, the large number of 
demobilized fighters in the Grand Nord, many of whom feel abandoned and 
disappointed with the post-settlement order, ensured that Hilaire and his coalition had 
no lack of recruits.25 
 
Disappointment is not limited to military circles, but can also be found among the 
political cadres of the RCD/K-ML, who are in a dire position, being increasingly 
subject to the harassment and exclusion that befalls opposition parties in the Congo.26  
Such generalized resentment creates fertile ground for politico-military entrepreneurs 
and the manipulation of armed mobilization. In January 2014, the FARDC launched 
large-scale military operations against the ADF with the support of the United 
Nations Mission in the DRC, MONUSCO. This military shakeup has unleashed 
profound instability. In the course of 2014 and 2015, a string of attacks on civilians 
took place, which killed over 550 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. Only a 
part of these attacks are believed to have been perpetrated by the ADF, as a form of 
revenge killings and military strategy (UNSC 2016). The inability to identify the 
perpetrators of these massacres has created general confusion and generated a stream 
of rumors that competing factions among the Nande and other groups in the Grand 
Nord are trying to manipulate, including the personal networks of Mbusa Nyamwisi, 
other factions in the RCD/K-ML, and allies of Paluku linked to the presidential 
patronage network. This last camp alleged that Mbusa was behind the horrendous 
attacks, supposedly through his M23 connections, and used this as a pretext to crack 
down further on his networks, in particular those running the parallel economic 
system of the Grand Nord. A number of high-profile businesspeople were arrested, 
and numerous RCD/KML-affiliated urban authorities in the city of Beni were 
replaced by members of pro-government parties. Mbusa loyalists in the RCD/K-ML, 
for their part, have tried to capitalize upon the instability by presenting it as evidence 
for Mbusa’s crucial role in stabilizing the Grand Nord. Furthermore, they have 
attempted to lay the blame on Paluku, accusing him of collaboration with the ADF via 
the army general in charge of military operations against this group (Sweet 2015). 
Mbusa also resurfaced in the media, claiming to have superior knowledge about the 
attacks, thereby again creating an aura of mystery that has been typical of his 
operations (Rolley 2014). However, the accusations against Mbusa also reinforced 
efforts by competitors within the RCD/K-ML to oust him from power. These 
opposing factions intensified publicity efforts to highlight that Mbusa had already 
been expelled from the presidency and the party by the national political council in 
November 2013, in the wake of allegations of his involvement with the M23. The fact 
that these earlier efforts to expel him had limited effects demonstrates the extent to 
which Mbusa continues to be seen as an incarnation of the party (Forum des As 
2014). 
 
The efforts to influence the framing of the instability and in this manner discredit 
opponents, or what Mbusa himself aptly described in a radio interview at the end of 
2014 as “politique des boucs-émissaires” (scapegoat politics), shows that the 
manipulation of insecurity to reinforce one’s position does not only take place in a 
direct manner, by sponsoring violence, but also in more subtle ways. In the absence of 
certainty about the facts, allegations, rumors and names are manipulated and 
instrumentalized, causing a semblance of maintaining links to armed groups, or 
allegations of being involved in massacres, to be almost as effective a power strategy 
as openly maintaining these links or perpetrating violence itself. This type of rumor 
economy also allows for linking unrelated conflicts and animosities, and thereby 
strategically deploying various conflict narratives as a mobilizing resource (Sweet 
2015). Perversely, these smokescreen tactics seem to both lower the costs and 
enhance the effectiveness of the pompier-pyromane strategy, allowing growing 
numbers of political-military actors to reap its fruits. 
 
Concluding remarks: the democratization of Pompier-Pyromania 
 
The Global and All-Inclusive Accord, the adoption of which signaled a formal end to 
the Second Congo War in 2003, created a new architecture for the Congo’s political 
and security landscape. Ex-belligerents transformed into political parties and, after a 
brief period of power-sharing, participated in electoral politics. This chapter has 
focused on the post-settlement trajectory of one of the politico-military entrepreneurs 
participating in these transformations, Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi, the leader of the 
former insurgent movement RCD/K-ML, reconstituted in 2003 as a political party. 
Between 2003 and 2011, Mbusa held a ministerial portfolio, while also standing as a 
presidential candidate in both the 2006 and 2011 elections, although more for 
symbolic considerations than in the expectation of winning. Furthermore, in 2011 he 
successfully ran for office as a national MP in the city of Butembo, traditionally one 
of his strongholds. On both occasions, he anticipated running as part of a broader 
platform, but each time this strategy fell through. Therefore, in 2006, he eventually 
took part in a pro-government alliance and in 2011 he went ahead as a standalone part 
of a fragmented opposition. 
 
This shift towards the opposition at once reflected and further promoted his changing 
position in the political landscape, characterized by a growing marginalization within 
and eventual falling out of grace with the presidential patronage network. 
Furthermore, it appears to be in part an outcome of the continuation of his war-era 
strategies of “multi-positioning” and “brokerage”. These strategies consisted of 
forging links to multiple factions, including those nominally opposed, in various 
arenas, allowing him to serve as a gatekeeper and to gain leverage by constantly 
threatening to switch sides. Crucially, Mbusa served as an intermediary between 
Kinshasa and powerful Nande business networks in the Grand Nord, his main 
powerbase. In exchange for loyalty, he shielded this constituency from central state 
regulation and taxation. While this underpinned his power in the immediate post-
settlement era, it became a source of frustration to the presidential patronage network 
in the medium term, as these networks deprived it of significant tax revenues and 
influence. Consequently, the president and his entourage stepped up efforts to break 
into the quasi-autonomous power complex of the Grand Nord. An important way to 
accomplish this was to weaken Mbusa’s position in the national political arena, which 
would increase his dependency on presidential patronage. When these efforts failed to 
have the desired effects, the presidential patronage network engineered and co-opted a 
competitor to divide the Grand Nord power complex. 
 
Mbusa responded to his growing marginalization by employing the same tried-and-
tested strategies as he had relied on during the war, which had prompted him at the 
time to maintain links with various armed actors, including Mai-Mai groups, the 
Ugandan rebels of the ADF, and figures in the Ugandan military establishment. In the 
post-settlement era, some of these links continued, although not in so overt a fashion 
or always with the purpose of direct manipulation. Rather, these contacts served as a 
way of hedging, of continuing to be of relevance to various regimes and factions 
eager to ward off potential threats, and allowed him to enlarge his room for maneuver 
by keeping a potential for armed mobilization and side-switching. In so far as 
maintaining these contacts and pursuing these strategies have contributed to the 
eastern Congo’s ongoing militarization, the fostering of organized violence can be 
seen as the main security outcome of Mbusa’s post-settlement political participation, 
although this outcome has often been achieved in a more indirect than a direct 
manner. 
 
The reasons for Mbusa’s continuing to covertly play the rebel card lie both within his 
individual agency, being heir to a form of militarized political strategizing that had 
been pioneered by his brother Enoch Muvingi, and the nature of the Congo’s post-
settlement political order. This order contains incentive structures that promote 
employing armed posturing as a way of political positioning (Stearns et al. 2013). The 
periodic organization of elections further feeds into this. Not only do elections widen 
the space for political competition, drawing in large numbers of actors and thereby 
intensifying competition, they also raise the stakes, due to the zero-sum game nature 
of the political environment. Furthermore, elections fuel ethnic outbidding, which 
may lead to the increased mobilization of armed groups formed along ethnic lines. 
The politico-military entrepreneurs that populate the eastern Congo’s political 
landscape combine electoral politics with various forms of military manipulation, as 
evidenced by the large number of provincial and national MPs and candidates who 
harness armed groups to influence electoral processes or compensate for their 
disappointing outcomes (UNSC 2011). In comparison to the pre-war order, these 
politico-military entrepreneurs have become more numerous, more independent of the 
political center, and more active also at lower levels of the power pyramid. As such, 
the post-settlement order seems to be characterized by a type of “democratization” of 
the strategy of the pompier-pyromane, with politico-military entrepreneurs 
proliferating at all levels of the system. This democratization unleashes a dynamic 
that often acquires a momentum of its own, due to the multiplicity of the involved 
factions and their complex and ever-changing alliances. As a result, not everyone who 
divides is still able to rule, and not everyone who ignites is still able to extinguish. 
 
Yet, as the political trajectory of Mbusa Nyamwisi and the RCD/K-ML shows, it is 
not only electoral participation and outcomes that create incentives for political 
positioning via real or suspected recourse to arms. It was to a large extent Mbusa’s 
efforts to maintain or regain a position in the presidential patronage network that 
pushed him to continue links with armed actors. Therefore, when analyzing the causes 
of the militarization of the current order, it is difficult to disaggregate the specific 
effects of politico-military entrepreneurs’ electoral participation from those related to 
their general inclusion in the political arena, including their integration in the state 
apparatus and presidential patronage network. At the same time, Mbusa’s trajectory 
illustrates that there are clear limitations to translating control over militarized 
networks into political capital. Importantly, his power has been increasingly 
undermined by the rising fortunes of Julien Paluku, who has only limited influence 
over armed actors. However, even Paluku has benefited from armed mobilization, 
although in a very indirect manner, trying to capitalize upon the massacres that took 
place in the course of 2014 and 2015 by engaging in scapegoat politics. 
 
The tragic episode of the massacres demonstrates how, due to the multitude of armed 
factions that are present in the Grand Nord, as in the eastern Congo as a whole, 
participation in pompier-pyromania  is widening, even though sometimes primarily 
through smokescreen tactics. By generating profound confusion and uncertainty over 
perpetrators and alliances, this opaque multitude allows political actors of all stripes 
to accuse their opponents of engaging in manipulation and violence, regardless of the 
evidence. These complexities highlight that while the Congo’s post-settlement order 
is militarized, this militarization has become of an increasingly diffuse nature, with 
covert and suspected alliances with armed groups being as important as the direct and 
open sponsoring of violence. However, real violence continues to be the engine of this 
economy of rumors and posturing, and capitalizing upon suspected links to armed 
groups is only possible when these groups actually exist. 
 
While the described militarization of the post-settlement order is to a large extent an 
outcome of the wars and the subsequent transition, it draws on developments that 
started in the pre-war period. At the start of the 1990s, Mbusa’s brother Enoch 
Muvingi pioneered liaising with armed groups as a political strategy. These 
continuities show how strongly the Congo’s post-settlement order is shaped by 
institutional configurations that developed in the Mobutu era, putting the effects of 
politico-military entrepreneurs’ post-settlement political participation in that order 
into perspective. Hence, the roots of the current system of pompier-pyromanocracy  
run much deeper than the post-settlement period, although the dynamics in this 
period, as shaped by the practices of politico-military entrepreneurs like Antipas 
Mbusa Nyamwisi, have played an important role in its further expansion and 
democratization. 
 
The fragmentation, volatility and opacity of the political-military landscape fostered 
by the rise of pompier-pyromanocracy  have become increasingly difficult to manage, 
for the political center and external actors alike. Failing to get a grip on the complex 
political dynamics, the latter have largely resorted to either purely military or 
technocratic interventions. Meanwhile, pompier-pyromanes, especially those that are 
not dressed in fatigues but don the cloaks of respectable politicians, have been able to 
light their fires quite openly. In fact, despite the reigning confusion, there are often 
substantial indications which politico-military entrepreneurs are involved in what 
blaze. Yet the Congolese government has mostly attempted to make use of such 
allegations for its own benefit, such as by discrediting political opponents. 
International actors, for their part, have been hesitant to get involved in the messy and 
risky business of addressing “rebels in suits” (Verweijen 2013). However, while 
indeed entailing a risk of being burnt, getting to the source of the fire seems the only 
viable way for the eastern Congo to rise out of its smoldering ashes. 
 
 
Notes 
1 Open lists imply that voters can choose any candidate from the political party lists they vote for. A 
multimember constituency means that each constituency has more than one elected representative, 
which tends to entrench fragmentation in divided systems. 
2 The Banyarwanda encompass a range of groups with different historical trajectories, including 
communities present on the soil of the Congo Free State when its boundaries were fixed; colonialera 
labor migrants from Rwanda; and waves of Rwandan refugees arriving on the eve of and at various 
stages after the Congo’s independence (Mamdani 1998). 
3 Interview with former RCD/K-ML cadre, Goma, 5 April 2014. 
4 Interview with former secretary-general RCD/K-ML, Goma, 6 April 2014. 
5 I am indebted to Mehdi Belaid for this qualification of Mbusa Nyamwisi’s strategies. 
6 Interview with former secretary-general, RCD/K-ML, Goma, 6 April 2014. 
7 Interview with RCD/K-ML party cadres, Goma, 6 and 7 April 2014. 
8 Information obtained from multiple sources during field research in Beni territory, April 2010. 
9 Granting Beni and Butembo the statute of city concerns a war-era policy decision of the RCD/K-ML 
that was formalized during the transition. Interviews with civil society members, Butembo, 28 April 
2010. 
10 Interview with RCD/K-ML party cadres, Goma, 6/7 April 2014. 
11 Interview with RCD/K-ML party cadres, Goma, 7 April 2014. 
12 “Julien Paluku Kahongya”,	https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julien_Paluku_Kahongya  
13 Interview with former RCD/K-ML cadre, Goma, 6 April 2014. 
14 Information obtained during field research in Beni territory, April 2010. 
15 Interview with political analyst, Goma, 7 April 2014. 
16 I am grateful to Rachel Sweet for bringing up this point. Personal communication, 12 December 
2014. 
17 It concerned the ministers José Endundo and Olivier Kamitatu as well as the MP Modeste Bahati 
Lukwebo. 
18 Interview with political cadres RCD/K-ML, Goma, 6 and 7 April 2014. 
19 Ibid. 
20 With the presidential elections, Mbusa came in fourth at the level of North Kivu with 12.74% of the 
votes. In three districts of the Grand Nord, he was the most voted-for presidential candidate: Beni 
(36.93%), Beni ville (32.98%) and Butembo (44.73%). Résultats présidentielle par territoires et villes 
[Results of the presidential elections per territory and per city], 
http://www.congoforum.be/upldocs/res_pres_territoires_villes_2011.pdf  
21 Personal communication with Rachel Sweet, 12 December 2014. 
22 Interview with sub-federal president RCD/K-ML, Goma, 5 April 2014. 
23 Interviews with journalists working in the Grand Nord, Goma, 6 April 2014. 
24 See for example the list of M23 officers exempted from reintegration into the FARDC published by 
the DRC government (Radio Kivu 1 Goma 2013). 
25 Interviews with ex-Mai Mai Vurundo officers, Butembo, 27 April 2010. 
26 Interview with RCD/K-ML cadres, Goma, 6 April 2014. 
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